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Lenz v. Commonwealth
544 S.E.2d 299 (Va. 2001)
Remington v. Commonwealth
551 S.E.2d 620 (Va. 2001)
. Fats
On January 16, 2000, Michael Lenz ("Lenz"), Jeffrey Remington
("Remington"), Brent Parker ("Parker"), and three other inmates attended a
meeting in Building J-5 at the Augusta Correctional Center. EarlJones ("Jones"),
a correctional officer, was assigned to Building J- 5 that evening. After closing the
door and securing the room, Jones noticed a commotion. Jones radioed other
correctional officers and requested help. As Jones walked toward the room
where the inmates were holding their meeting, three of the inmates ran out of the
room. One of the inmates said, "They're stabbing him."'
WhenJones went to the door, he saw Remington and Lenz stabbing Parker.
Jones ordered Lenz and Remington to stop stabbing Parker, but they did not.
Jones, who was unarmed, again used his radio to request help. After several
correctional officers arrived at the meeting room, the officers entered the room
and told Lenz and Remington "to drop" their knives. One of the officers
testified that he saw Remington stab Parker "[a]bout four or five times."'
Another officer testified that he saw Remington stab Parker "eight to ten times"
around the stomach and chest? Lenz and Remington surrendered their knives,
and they were handcuffed and escorted from the area. Parker was transported
by ambulance to the Augusta Medical Center, where he died.!
Lenz was tried and convicted bya juryon an indictment cha"nhim with
the capital murder of Parker under Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(3). The jury
fixed Lenz's punishment at death, and the court sentenced him in accord with the
jury's verdict. Remington's motion to transfer his capital murder trial from
Augusta County to the City of Buena Vista was granted. A jury found Reming-
ton guiltyof the capital murder of Parker under Virginia Code Section 1821-31(3)
1. Lenz v. Commonwealth, 544 S.E2d 299, 301 (Va. 2001).
2. Remington v. Commonwealth, 551 S.E.2d 620,624-25 (Va. 2001).
3. Id at 625.
4. Lem, 544 SE.2d at 302.
5. Id at 301; se aso VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(3) (hlichie Supp. 2001) (defining cpital
murder as "[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of anyperson by a prisoner confied
in a state or local correctional facility as defined in S 53.1-1, or while in the custody of an employee
thereof").
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and fixed Remington's punishment at death. The circuit court sentenced
Remington in accord with this verdict.6
A. Issus Raised in Lenz
During the penalty phase of his trial, Lenz testified that he had planned to
murder Parker that day.7 A psychologist employed at the Augusta Correctional
Center testified that, in his opinion, Lenz had murdered Parker based "solelyon
a religious conviction."' Lenz's mother testified about Lenz's childhood.9 The
Chief of Operations at the Viginia Department of Corrections and the Assistant
Warden of Operations at the Red Onion State Prison both testified about
"prison life" and the securityconditions that Lenz would encounter at a Viuginia
maximum security correctional facility if he were sentenced to life imprison-
ment.
0
On appeal, Lenz argued that the circuit court abused its discretion in
denying his request for the appointment of an expert at the Commonwealth's
expense on the subject of "prison life."" Lenz also argued that the circuit court
erred in denying his pretrial motion "to poll individual jurors as to which statu-
tory aggravating factors and elements of vileness were found." 2
The Commonwealth filed and was granted a pretrial motion in limine
requesting that the circuit court prohibit Lenz from introducing evidence about
Parker's criminal record." Although the circuit court ruled in favor of the
Commonwealth's motion, during the penalty phase Lenz tried to elicit informa-
tion regarding Parker's criminal record.'4 The circuit court sustained the Com-
monwealth's objection to this, and Lenz argued on appeal that the circuit court
erred in sustaining this objection."5 Finally, Lenz argued that when reviewing the
trial record and records from other cases to ensure that passion or prejudice did
not influence the jury and the sentence of death was not excessive or dispropor-
tionate, the court should have compared his case to those dealing with murders
in which the defendant and the victim were inmates at a correctional facility
1 6
6. Rain, 551 SE.2d at 624.
7. Lim, 544 S.E2d at 303.
8. Id. at 302-03.
9. Id. at 303.
10. Id.
11. Id at304.
12. Id at 305.






B. Issus Raisad in Remington
During the penalty phase of Remington's trial, the Commonwealth intro-
duced Remington's prior convictions."7 A mitigation expert testified that
Remington "had a very troubled upbringing," that his biological father was "an
alcoholic [and] a very violent man," and that Remington was sexually molested
as a child. 8 Remington testified that he had been raped when he was an inmate
at another correctional facility 9 He also testified that several inmates at the
Augusta Correctional Facility had threatened to rape him and that he "believed
that Parker was involved in those threats of rape."2" He testified that when he
informed Lenz that Parker had "threatened [his] life," Lenz told him to arm
himself with a knife."21 Remington stated that he took the knife to the meeting
for his protection.
On appeal, Remington asserted that the circuit court erred in not granting
his various pretrial discovery motions pertaining to potential witnesses and
informants n He also asserted error in the circuit court's removal of two pro-
spective jurors from the venire, claiming that their removal violated their consti-
tutional right to religious freedom 2' Remington also argued that the trial court
should have accepted his proposed juryinstruction, which would have instructed
the jury on the grades of murder, including second-degree murder and malicious
wounding.
25
Remington further claimed that he should have been granted a new sentenc-
ing hearing because the post-sentence report did not contain a victim impact
statement.26 Like Lenz, Remington also argued that after conducting the statuto-
rily required proportionality review, the court should have found that the death
sentence was "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases." 27 Finally, Remington argued that because he was in the hospital during
the jury's deliberations at the sentencing stage, his right to be present during trial
17. Rpmi" 551 S.E2d at 625.





23. Id at 628.
24. Id
25. Id at 631.
26. Id at 632-33.
27. Id at 637-38.
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was violated." The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected all of Remington's claims
of error.9
I. Hddr
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgments of both circuit
courts, finding no reversible error in the records and "perceiving no reason to
commute the death sentence."30
I. A ,nlis /Appioan in V iia
A. Ca Issues
1. Via*n GmzcterEid
Both Lenz and Remington contended that the circuit courts erred in not
allowing them to present the jury with evidence of Parker's criminal record."
Each relied on Virginia Code Section 19.-264.4(B) and prior court decisions,
including Lodkev C 'ig'2 in arguing that he was entitled to present to the juryall
the facts when the jury was making a decision regarding his sentence.3 In both
cases, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that the defendant's assertions were
without merit. 4
28. ld at 636.
29. Id at 626-37.
30. Lim, 544 S.E2d at 311.
31. Id at 307; Redt" 551 S.E2d at 634.
32. 438 US. 586 (1978).
33. Len, 544 S.E.2d at 307; RerirwA 551 S.E2d at 634; sealsoLockett v. Ohio, 438 US.
586, 604 (1978) (holding that the sentencer should be able to consider, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death, as long as the court deems such
evidence as being relevant to the defendant's charcter, prior record, or circumstances of his
offense); VA. GODE ANN. S 192-264.4(B) (Mchie 2000). Section 19.2-264.4(B) states:
In cases of trial by jury, evidence may be presented as to any matter which the court
deems relevant to sentence, except that tunder the provisions of J 192-299, or
Sunder anyrule of court, shall not be admited into evidence. Evidence which maybe
admsil, subject to the rules of evidence governingt admissl M ,ie urpdiateofns,th isoy bc  fn include the
cicustances surroundin, the offense, the histo an g . of defendant,
and any other facts inm mtation of the offense. Facts in mtgation .mayicude, but
shall not be limited to, the followi : tithe defendant has no significa history of
prior criminal activity, ('a the capita felony was committed while ihe defendant was
inder the i .f ine eteof ,-ntal or emotional disturbance (i the victim was a
participant in the defendants conduct or consented to the act ,) at the time of the
commission of the capital felony, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criiality of his conduct or to conform His conduct to the requirements of law was
sign&wan impaired, ( v) the age of the defendant at the time of the commission of
the capital offense, or vi mental retardation of the defendant
d
34. Len, 544 S.E.2d at 307; RwWi 551 S.E.2d at 634-35.
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The court in Lenz held that Parker's criminal historywas not relevant to any
issue in the proceeding." The court found that "[t]he victim's prior convictions
had no relevance to the issue whether the defendant's acts were vile, inhuman,
or showed depravity of mind, and the victim's criminal record was not relevant
to the issue whether the defendant would constitute a serious continuing threat
to society."3 6 The court dismissed Lenz's contention under Lodceu; stating that
Lenz had no constitutional right to present evidence of Parker's criminal
history." The court pointed out that Parker's history was neither relevant, nor
had anybearing on, the circumstances of Lenz's offense, because Lenz admitted
during the penalty phase of the trial that he did not like Parker and that he had
intended to kill Parker because Parker did not respect his religious beliefs." The
court in RivV= relied on Lenz to reach the same conclusion, holding that
"generally, a defendant does not have a constitutional right to present evidence
of a victim's criminal history."39
Remington also contended that he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing
because the circuit court admitted a post-sentence report that did not contain a
victim impact statement." Remington raised this contention under Virginia
Code Section 192-264.5, which states that when a defendant's punishment has
been fixed at death, the court must direct a post-sentence report to be made."'
The statute requires that "such reports shall in all cases contain a Victim Impact
Statement." '2 The court rejected this argument, stating that "the Crime Victim
and Winess Rights Act, of which Code Section 192-264.5 is a part, was enacted
to 'preserve the right of victims of crimes to have the impact of those crimes
upon their lives considered as part of the sentencing process, if that is their
wish."' 43 The court stated that the statutorilyrequired victim impact statement in
the post-sentence report did not confer any rights upon a capital murder defen-
dant." The court also found that Remington "was not prejudiced bythe omis-
sion of a victim-impact statement in the post-sentence report," and, therefore,
a new sentencing hearing was not warranted.45
35. Lmz, 544 S.E2d at 307.
36. Id
37. Id
38. Id at 308.
39. Rv 551 S.E2d at 635.
40. Id at 632-33.
41. Id; seealso VA. ODDE ANI S 192-2645. (Mbkie 2000).
42. Retiu 551 SX.2d at 633; saeako S 19.2-264.5.






The court's decision to exclude Lenz's evidence regarding Parker's criminal
record is surprising in light of its recent decision in Sdinit v
Although the Supreme Court of V'iginia found that under Virginia Code Section
192-264.4 evidence pertaining to the victim's character is not relevant in estab-
lishing vileness or future dangerousness,"" the Commonwealth is allowed to
include non-statutory victim impact evidence.4 In Sdmit, the Commonwealth
was allowed to present testimonyfrom the victim's friends and co-workers about
the victim's "kindness" and "generosity ," as well as evidence showing that he had
received several commendations during his twentyyears of service in the United
States Army and that he had three children.49 This is in stark contrast to the
court's decision in Len. The court's disparity in admitting victim impact evi-
dence suggests that it is basing its determination on the actual nature of the
evidence, rather than on the relevance or probative value of such evidence in the
jury's consideration of the death sentence. In coming to its decision in Sdmia;
the court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Paw u Tonm-
soe,'° in which the Court articulated that "for the jury to assess meaningfully the
defendant's moral culpabilityand blameworthiness, it should have before it at the
sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused bythe defendant.""1 For
the sake of consistency, the court should either completely allow or disallow
proffered evidence of the victim's character, regardless of whether the evidence
portrays the victim as a "good guy" or a "bad guy."
2. Pxwimd Reziew
Pursuant to Virginia Code Section 17.1-313(E), the Virginia Supreme Court
said it "examined records in all capital murdercases previouslyreviewed by[that]
court when, as here, the death penalty was imposed based upon.., the capital
murder of an inmate while the defendant was confined in a state or local correc-
tional facility." 2 The court conducted this review to ensure that the death
sentence in Lenz's case was proportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
46. Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 547 S.E2d 186 (Va. 20011] (rejecting defendant's assign-
meats of error and affirming Schmit's sentence of death).
47. Lev,, 544 S.E2d at 307.
48. So eg, SSnii, 547 SE.2d at 193. Busee VA. CODE ANN. S 192-299.1 (Mlchie 2000)
(providing the scope and content of victim impact testimony at a capital sentencing).
49. Id
50. 501 US. at 808 (1991).
51. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 US. 808,825 (1991) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does
not bar presentation of victim impact evidence to a capital sentencing juzy).
52. Lem, 544 S.E.2d at 310;sealsoVA.O JDEANN. 5 17.1-313(C)(2) (Mlclie 1999) (requiring
the court to determine whether the sentence of death in a particular case is "excessive ordispropor-
tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant").
[Vol. 14:1
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cases.5" The court stated that the records included capital murder cases in which
the death penalty was imposed, as well as cases in which a life sentence was
imposed and the defendant petitioned the court for an appeal.' Lenz argued that
the most significant circumstance surrounding the offense was the fact that both
he and the victim were prisoners confined in a state correctional facility at the
time the murder was committed. 5 Lenz pointed out that there was no underly-
ing felony in his case, and thus, that had the same offense been committed
outside the prison, "it could only have been charged as first degree murder."'
Lenz argued that, therefore, the similar cases against which his case was com-
pared should have been murders where the defendant and the victim were
inmates at a correctional facility"
In rejecting Lenz's argument, the court reiterated its position in Jcbmcn v
& NI&t, 58 in which it held that in conducting its proportionalityreview, the
court must determine whether other sentencing bodies in the Commonwealth
generallyimposed the death penalty for comparable or similar crimes, consider-
ing both the crime and the defendant. 9 The court held that in Lenz's case "the
fact that the defendant was an inmate, who killed another inmate, [was] only one
factor to consider in determining whether other juries generally impose the
sentence of death for similar crimes."' The court held that Virginia Code
Section 17.1-313(Q(2) does not require that the court confine its review to
identical crimes61
In making its proportionalitydetermination in Lez, the court stated that it
examined cases in which the death penalty was imposed for the capital murder
of an inmate while the defendant was confined in a state or local correctional
facility, including Payw v r &m.' It is interesting to note that prior to
Lnz and RwrVvrtn, Payne was the only inmate-on-inmate homicide to result in
a death penalty since Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(3) was enacted. Payne's
death sentence was later commuted to life in prison by the Governor. 3 The
53. Lac, 544 S.E.2d at 310-11.
54. Ls, 544 S.E.2d at 310. In this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia did notinclud




58. 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 2000).
59. Lem, 544 S.E2d at 310;, seakoJohnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769, 786 (Va.
2000) (holding that defendant's age was only one factor to consider in determining whether other
juries generally imposed the sentence of death for similar crimes).
60. Lez, 544 S.E2d at 310.
61. Id
62. Id; see also Payne v. Commonweakh, 357 S.E.2d 500 (Va. 1987).
63. Len, 544 S.E2d at 311.
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court stated that the Governor's decision to commute Payne's death sentence did
not necessarily render Lenz's sentence excessive, because the court "do[es] not
consider the actions of the executive branch when making [its] statutorydetermi-
nation of proportionality."'
Remington argued that the circuit court erred in not applying mandatory
proportionality principles to impose a life sentence." Like Lenz, Remington
pointed out that there were no other Virginia cases with similar facts involving
an inmate victim that had resulted in the death penalty." The court found that
Remington's claim was meritless, holding that "the circuit court was not required
to conduct a proportionality analysis."6 Although the court noted that Virginia
Code Section 192-264.5 allows a circuit court to set aside a death sentence upon
good cause shown, it found that the circuit court had established that the evi-
dence justified the jury's decision and that the imposition of the death penalty in
this case was proportionate.6
Another interesting point to consider is the under-representation of cases
in which the defendant received a life sentence for a capital murder. Life sen-
tence cases may not be appealed and often the opinions are unpublished. Thus,
these cases are not included in the comparison the court is required to make.
Those life cases that are appealed and published often do not include the aggra-
vators. These factors necessarilydistort the cases reviewed bythe Supreme Court
of Virginia toward the death sentence, making the required proportionality
review meaningless and undermining the purpose of Virginia Code Section 17.1-
313.69
B. Issues inLenz
1. Cmwrti;ra fizv Pris oLR)
Lenz, relying on Ake v QklaxnO and Huske v C mnmadd," asserted
through a pretrial motion that he should receive a court-appointed expert witness
on the subject of prison operations and classifications?2 Lenz asserted that this
64. Id
65. Rer"Wew 551 S.E.2d at 634.
66. Id
67. Id
68. Rw?" 551 SE.2d at 634; seVA. (bDE ANN. S 19.2-264.5 ichi 2000).
69. Sic Gregory v. Commonwealth, No. 1671-99-2, 2001 WL 242227, at *1 (Va. Q. App.
March 13,2001) (unpublished capital murder opinion in which defendant was given a life sentence).
Seg=1ayKellyEP. Bennett, Pn ditmy"Retew 7xHiswriadAppkaiatdanDqrd=i, 12 CAP.
DEF.J. 103, 106 (1999).
70. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
71. 476 S.E.2d 920 (1996).
72. Lem, 544 S.E2d at 304; seealo Aike v. Oklahoma, 470 US. 68 (1985); Husske v. Corn-
[Vol. 14:1
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expert witness should be retained at the Commonwealth's expense."' Lenz
argued that "the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the federal constitution required the circuit court to appoint, at
the Commonwealth's expense, an expert to assist him."74
The court rejected this argument, stating that the court in Ake stipulated
that "[t]he indigent defendant who seeks the appointment of an expert must
show a particularized need.""3 The court held that the circuit court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Lenz's request for a "prison life" expert and that this
denial did not result in a "fundamentally unfair trial."76 Applying the principles
set forth in A ke, the court noted that Lenz had not demonstrated that "prison
life" was likely to be a significant factor in his defense, thus necessitating a
"prison life" expert." Therefore, the court found that Lenz suffered no preju-
dice as a result of the circuit court's denial of his request."
Lenz also argued that the circuit court's purported denial of his pretrial
motion "to poll individual jurors as to which statutory aggravating factors and
elements of vileness were found" was error.' Lenz contended that the circuit
court denied his motion in an order dated July 25, 20000 However, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia stated that it did not find any circuit court order in the
record disposing of this motion." The court concluded that the circuit court did
not rule on Lenz's motion and that therefore the defendant had waived his claim
in this regard." In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the defendant must
request a ruling from the circuit court, which Lenz failed to do.83
2. Apprendi Issue
Lenz moved the circuit court to allow an instruction which stated that the
jury could only give him the death penalty "based upon the vileness predicate if
the jury unanimously agreed that the Commonwealth's evidence proves torture
or depravity of mind or an aggravated batteryto the victim beyond the minimum
monweah, 476 SE.2d 920 (1996).
73. Id
74. Id





80. Id at 305-06.





necessary to accomplish an act of murder."" The proposed instruction would
have also stipulated that the jury's "decision must be unanimous as to at least one
of the above to find that [the defendant's] conduct was outrageouslyor wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman."8 5 While the circuit court refused Lenz's proposed jury
instruction, it is important to note that the Supreme Court of Virginia did not
actually affirm this decision. 6 Instead, the court did not reach this issue because
the jury fixed Lenz's punishment at death based on both future dangerousness
and vileness.87
In Appmdi v New jrsey," the United States Supreme Court held that
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, anyfact that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."" AppnA read in conjunction with
earlier cases from the United States Supreme Court, appears to require the
Virginia courts to provide jury instructions that require the jury to find each
statutory aggravator and each vileness subelement beyond a reasonable doubt
and unanimously. This will provide the jurywith "clear and objective standards
... [and] will enhance the reliability of the death sentence."'
C Issus in Remington
1. AP ial DisXUy Mcti
Remington filed a pretrial motion asking the circuit court to order the
Commonwealth to comply with various discovery requests.9' Remington as-
serted that the circuit court's denial of this motion violated his federal and state
constitutional rights.' The court upheld the circuit court's decisions, finding no
merit in Remington's claims."
Remington requested the Commonwealth to provide a list of all expert
witnesses it intended to call at trial, as well as each expert's qualifications, a
description of the expert's contemplated testimony, and the expert's report."
84. Id at 308.
85. Id. (alterations in origina.
86. Id
87. Id
88. 530 US. 466 (2000).
89. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US. 466, 490 (2000).
90. SwM Kate Calvert, Cbig Uhmn* 'yda Sra dqfPtifcun d VilM Ss&ElnmM
u-, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 1,35 (2000).
91. Rwit; 551 SEld at 627.
92. Id at 628.
93. Id
94. Id at 627.
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Remington also requested access to any evidence the Commonwealth planned
to offer at any sentencing proceeding, including:
(a) the names and addresses of all witnesses, a summary of their ex-
pected testimony and with respect to expert witnesses, a copyof their
professional qualifications, resume or &urriculum vitae; (-) any evi-
dence of una c ated acts of misconduct for future dangerousness,
and the alleged dates and witnesses to such acts- (c) a copy of any
statement by a non-witness declarant to be offered into evudYnce; andi
(d) an opportunity to inspect, test, and copy any physical evidence.95
The court held that this discoveryrequest was improper because Remington did
not have a "general right to discovery of witness statements, reports, or other
memoranda possessed by the Commonwealth."'
Remington also moved the circuit court to compel discovery of "[a]ll
memoranda, documents, and reports to, from, or between law enforcement
officers connected with the subject matter of this case," as well as any material
that could be exculpatory or be used to impeach a witness' Remington re-
quested discovery pertaining to any "occasion on which any potential witness
ha[d] testifed... in relation to any of the defendants, the investigation, or the
facts of this case."9' The Supreme Court of Virgnia held that the circuit court's
denial of this motion did not violate any of Remington's constitutional rights
because the circuit court had already entered an order requiring the Common-
wealth "to provide.., all exculpatory evidence to impeach witnesses."" The
court also found that Remington's rights were not abridged because the Con-
monwealth provided him complete access to its investigation file and allowed
him to examine its entire file."°
Finally, Remington requested discovery of the identity of any informant,
"regardless of whether said informant [would] be called as a witness at trial"' I
Remington contended that the circuit court's denial of this request "violated his
federal right to 'the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his
communication [that] is relevant and helpful to the defense of the accused, or is
essential to a fair determination of a cause.m' The Supreme Court of Virginia
95. Id
96. Id at 628 (quoting Clagett v. Commonwealh, 472 S.E2d 263,269 (Va. 1996) (holding
that a trial court mayproperlydenya defendant's discoveryrequest where the requested documents
are represented as containing no exculpatory materiao).
97. Id at 627.
98. Id
99. Id at 628.
100. Id
101. Id at 627.
102. Id at 628.
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rejected this argument because Remington failed to show how this information
would have assisted his defense, and because no informant 'testified at trial'03
2 Vair Die
The circuit court removed two members of the jury panel, Sharon Martin
("Martin") and Barbara Pentecost ("Pentecost"), fromthe venire.14 Duringvoir
dire, the court asked Martin whether she had "any religious, philosophical, or
moral beliefs which would prevent or substantiallyirnpair [her] abilityto convict
a person of a crime which potentiallycarried a death penalty."" 5 Martin testified
that she did not believe in the death penalty and that she did not think she could
ever impose a death penalty. 6 During Pentecost's voir dire, the court went over
various jury instructions, including the presumption of innocence and the
requirement that the Commonwealth nmst prove each element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find a defendant guilty.107 The court then
asked Pentecost if she had "anytype of moral orphilosophical beliefs that would
prevent [her] from following that instruction.", Pentecost responded that "[i]f
it has anything to do with... lethal injection... I do not believe in that.""°
When asked if she would consider the death penalty, she testified that "[she did
not] think [she] could live with [her]self if [she] had anything to do with putting
someone to death.""1 Remington contended that excluding these two prospec-
tive jurors violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights relating to
religious freedom."1'
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the circuit court's decision, holding
that "the circuit court's decision t6 remove a juror for cause will not be reversed
on appeal unless that decision constitutes manifest error.""' The court found
that it "must give deference to the circuit court's determination whether to
exclude a prospective juror because that court was able to see and hear the




106. Id at 628-29.
107. Id at 629.
108. I d
109. Id
110. Id at 630.
111. Id at 628.
112. Id at 630; see also Green v. Commonwealth, 546 SE.2d 446,451 (Va. 2001) (stating that
"the circuit court's refusal to strike a juror for cause will not be disturbed on appeal unless that
decision constitutes manifest error").
113. Reri" 551 .E2d at 630; sealso GMw 546 S.E.2d at 451 (holding that the court.must consider the voir dire as a whole, and not the juror's isolated statements").
[Vol. 14:1
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circuit court is in a superior position to determine whether a prospective juror.
would be impaired or prevented from performing the duties of a juror."114
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the removal of Martin and
Pentecost from the venire did not violate Remington's constitutional rights
because their removal was not based on their religious beliefs."' The court
found that the circuit court properly excluded them from the jury panel because
they stated that theywould not vote to impose a sentence of death.116 The court
held that the circuit court did not err in removing them "because their responses
demonstrated that their personal objections to the death penalty would have
substantially impaired or prevented them from performing their duties as
jurors." 
117
3. 7he Cacnul%'s Ezideie
Remington argued that the cituit court erred in denying his motion to
"strike the Commonwealth's evidence on the basis that the evidence did not
establish that he had inflicted the fatal wounds upon Parker.""' Remington
relied on Virginia's "triggerman rule," which excludes principals in the second
degree from eligibilityfor capital murder. The Supreme Court of Virginia, relying
on Strkkerv C&wzmdz,1 9 held that "when two or more persons took a direct
part in inflicting fatal injuries, each participant in the murder was an immediate
perpetrator for purposes of the capital murder statutes." 20 The court found that
"the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Remington and Lenz
jointly participated in the fatal stabbing of Parker."'21 The court also noted that
the medical examiner found that Parker had sixty-eight separate stab wounds, "all
of which contributed to his death," and that thus, the circuit court did not err
when it denied Remington's motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence."
114. Rn, wim, 551S.E.2d at 630; seeaLsoScbmi v. Commonwealth, 547 S.E.2d186,195 (Va.
2001j (stating that a "prospective juror should be excluded for cause based on the juror's views
about the death penaltyif those views would substantiallyimpair or prevent the performance of the
juror's duties in accordance with his oath and the court's instructions").




119. 404 S.E.2d 227 (Va. 1991).
120. Rarir" 551 S.E2d at 630;seeStrickler v. Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 227,234-35 (Va.
1991) (stating that an instruction which allows that a defendant may be found "guilty of capital
murder if the evidence establishes that the defendant jointlyparticipated in the fatal beating, if it is
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was an active and immediate participant
in the act or acts that caused the victim's death" is an appropriate instruction).
121. Rerrbjcm 551 S.E.2d at 631.
122. Id at 630.
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Remington also argued that his capital murder conviction must be set aside
because "the evidence of premeditation was insufficient as a matter of law."'3
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, stating that the "'question whether a
defendant is guilty of a premeditated killing of the victim is usually a jury ques-
tion. 124 The court found thatpremeditation required onlythat a specific intent
to kill must exist some time before the killing but that this intent need not exist
for any specified length of time. 2' The court held that there was sufficient
evidence in this case for the juryto find premeditation. 126 The court held that
"the jury was entitled to find that [Remington] had a specific intent to kill
[Parker], based upon [Remington's] acts of stabbing the victim at least eight to
ten times in the stomach and chest"1lD
4. P4frdjwyImmxiiaz
Remington asserted that "even if the circuit court did not err in denying his
motion to strike" the Commonwealth's evidence, that court erred in refusing to
give his proffered jury instructions, because "there [was] certainly sufficient
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could [have found that he was] merely a
principal in the second degree.""' Remington proffered an instruction that
would have instructed the jury to find him guilty of being a principal in the
second degree unless he inflicted the fatal blows that caused Parker's death.'
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that this instruction was not wirranted
because there was no evidence showing that a sole perpetrator had accomplished
the kiling.30 The court found that the "evidence established beyond a reason-
able doubt that Remington and Lenz jointly participated in Parker's death.""'
Remington also proffered an instruction that would have required the jury
to find that he was an active and immediate participant in order to convict him
of capital murder."' Another proposed instruction directed that if the jury
believed that Parker had alreadybeen fatallywounded byLenz before Remington
entered into the attack, or if it had a reasonable doubt thereof, it must find
Remington not guiltyof capital murder. 3 The court found that the circuit court
123. Id at 632.
124. Id (quoting Weeks v. Conmmoneaklth, 450 S-2d 379,390 (Va. 1994)).
125. Id; swalso Smith v. Commonvveh, 261 SE.2d 550, 553 (Va. 1980).
126. Roanid 551 S.E2d at 632.
127. Id
128. Id at 630-31.







properlyrejected these instructions "because the substance of th[ese]instructions
was included in other instructions given by the court."'
The Supreme Court of Virginia also held that the circuit court properly
refused Remington's proposed jury instructions on the lesser-included offenses
to capital murder.13 Remington proposed instructions that informed the juryon
the different grades of homicide, including second-degree murder and malicious
wounding. The court held that an instruction on second-degree murder, as a
lesser-included offense of capital murder, must be supported by the evidence,
and that such evidence "'must amount to more than a scintilla."'"36 The Supreme
Court of Virginia held that these instructions were not appropriate, because the
evidence showed that Remington and Lenz jointly participated in Parker's
murder.
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5. Rz& to/1v P ertat Trial
After counsel concluded their dosing arguments in the penalty phase, the
jurydecided to return the following morning to commence deliberations.3 That
same moming, Remington, who was wearing an electronic restraining belt, was
accidentally shocked and was therefore taken to the hospital for observation.'
When Remington's defense counsel was asked whether they had any objections
to proceeding with the jurydeliberations, Remington's lead counsel said, "I think
we should go ahead.""0 During a later hearing, the circuit court stated that the
jurywent directlyto the juryroom and that there was "no way' for the jurors to
know that Remington was not present. 4'
Remington argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to set
aside the verdict and grant a new sentencing hearing.42 Remington made this
claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Virginia
Code Section 19.2-259, which provides that "[a] person tried for felony shall be
personally present during the trial."4  The court relied on Pa r v'
CwmnuwW' to define the statutory phrase "during the trial" to mean "every
stage of the trial from his arraignment to his sentence, when anything is to be
done which can affect his interest."'I4 The court also stated that the Sixth and
134. Id
135. Id
136. Id at 632 (quoting Justus v. Commonwealth, 283 S.E.2d 905, 911 (Va. 1981)).
137. Rarir" 551 S.E2d at 630-32.
138. Id at 635.
139. Id
140. Id
141. Id at 635-36.
142. Id at 635.
143. Rmir 551 S.E2d at 635-36; see VA. QJDE ANN. S 192-259 (vfihie 2000).
144. 130 S.E. 398 (Va. 1925).
145. Reai" 551 Sl2d at636; sePalmer v. Coxnmonweakh, 130 SE. 398,402 (Va. 1925).
2001]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution "confer upon a defendant
the right to be present at trial." 'I
The court held that Remington waived any error relating to his absence
during the jury's deliberations because his counsel agreed to permit the jury to
begin its deliberations in his absence. 47 The court also held that Virginia Code
Section 19.2-259 "does not require a defendant's presence in the courtroom
while a juryis deliberating in another room."'48 It pointed out that "for security
reasons, a defendant in custody would have been placed in a holding cell during
the jury's deliberations."'49 The court found that Remington had the right to be
present "'at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if
his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure."" 0 The court
held that the circuit court committed no error.
[N)either the federal constitution nor the common law of [the] Com-
monweakh conferred upon [Reming on], who would have otherwise
been confined in a holdi cell, a right to be present in a courtroom
while the jury [was] in a diferent room deliberating, and nothing ...




146. RanWrir 551 S.E2d at 637.
147. Id at 636.
148. Id
149. Id
150. Id at 637 (quoting Kentuckyv. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987)).
151. Id
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